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A B S T R A C T
This paper aims to identify potential explanatory variables of the entrepreneurial orientation and innovation 
capacity (EO-IC) of family enterprises (FEs) through a comparative study of family businesses in Spain and Latin 
America. The innovation literature reports a paradigm shift whereby the dynamic boost provided by corporate 
governance and productivity is playing an increasing role as a driver of EO-IC and sustainable competitive ad-
vantage. This issue acquires particular relevance in the case of family firms, where entrepreneurial and innovation 
capacities are characteristically hampered by socio-emotional and risk-aversion factors. We construct a panel 
of data on 182 large family enterprises (1,820 observations) domiciled in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Spain, drawing on the Thomson Onebanker and ORBIS databases for the period 
2008-2018. The results reveal the emergence of new explanatory variables for the structure of the family-firm 
EO-IC framework, some related to productivity; others more basically to corporate governance. They also show 
that, in Latin America, the use of business efficiency (productivity) factors in the planning and potentiation of 
EO-IC by family firms is hampered by the institutional (legal, regulatory, labour and educational) environment, 
where traditional factors such as firm size and ownership concentration are more relevant. In the Spanish case, 
however, the evidence points to a transition from traditional inputs towards business efficiency and productivi-
ty-related factors.
Keywords: family firm, entrepreneurial orientation, innovation capacity, corporate governance, productivi-
ty, Latin America vs. Spain. 
R E S U M E N
El presente trabajo pretende analizar las variables explicativas de la orientación emprendedora y la capacidad de 
innovación de la empresa familiar (EO-IC) en un estudio comparativo de las empresas familiares españolas y 
latinoamericanas. A este respecto, se constata un cambio de paradigma en la literatura sobre innovación en el que 
las capacidades dinámicas derivadas del gobierno corporativo y de la productividad han ido cobrando progresiva 
importancia en la conformación de la (EO-IC) y en la consecución de una ventaja competitiva sostenible. Esta 
problemática cobra especial interés en el caso de la empresa familiar, donde las implicaciones socioemocionales 
y la aversión al riesgo, características de este tipo de empresa, ponen habitualmente en tela de juicio su capacidad 
para innovar y emprender. Construimos un panel con 182 grandes empresas familiares (1.820 observaciones) 
pertenecientes a Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, México, Perú, Uruguay y España, utilizando las bases de 
datos Thomson Onebanker y ORBIS para el período 2008-2018. Los resultados obtenidos evidencian la apa-
rición de nuevas variables explicativas en la configuración de la (EO-IC) de la empresa familiar, basadas en la 
productividad y fundamentalmente en el gobierno corporativo. De la misma manera, en la empresa familiar lati-
noamericana, se constata cómo el entorno institucional (legal, regulatorio, laboral y educativo) frena la utilización 
de variables de eficiencia (productividad), en favor de otras variables más tradicionales como tamaño y concen-
tración de la propiedad en el diseño y fortalecimiento de la OE CI. En el caso español, sin embargo, se evidencia 
la transición de variables tradicionales hacia factores relacionados con la eficiencia y productividad empresarial.
Palabras clave: empresa familiar, capacidad emprendedora, capacidad de innovación, gobierno corporativo, 
productividad, Latinoamérica vs. España. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The globalization of the economy carries both risks and op-
portunities for today’s society. Within this context, the transfor-
mation of its component units, such as businesses, faces the global 
market with the challenge of constant adaptation (Craft 2000). Au-
tomation, standardization and distribution formed the bulwark of 
firm modernization in the last century, whereas the identity of the 
twenty-first century is based on the use of information technolo-
gies (ICTs) grounded in the automation and digitalization of the 
economy (Pavitt 2005). These dynamics are driving the transfor-
mation towards higher industrial specialization, featuring small 
businesses equipped with the latest-generation technology. Thus, 
in an environment as volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous 
as the current one, the key to firm survival and sustainable com-
petitive advantage across all sectors will be to invest in innovation.
Against this background, analysis of the possible repercus-
sions of entrepreneurial orientation and innovation capacity 
(EO-IC) in all firms, particularly family enterprises (FEs), gains 
special relevance. Given an endowment of resources and specific 
capabilities that could either stimulate or hinder EO-IC activities, 
FEs provide an exceptional context for a case-study of EO-IC de-
velopment (Habbershon et al. 2003; Nordqvist et al. 2008; Zellwe-
ger et al. 2010). The close ownership-management relationship 
characteristic of the FE could have a decisive influence on the 
various dimensions of EO-IC (innovation, risk, pro-activeness, 
aggressive competitiveness and autonomy) (Zahra 2005; Casillas 
et al. 2011; Hernández-Linares and López-Fernández 2018). 
In light of the above, any growth and profitability differences 
among FEs could be due to variations in resource endowments, 
especially with respect to intangible resources, where acquisi-
tion, replication, accumulation and imitation by rival firms are 
more difficult (Barney 1991). Among the various intangible re-
sources, R&D investment, human capital training and corporate 
reputation are worth exploring as the three basic strategic inputs 
for building firms’ competitiveness (Huselid 1995; Roberts and 
Dowling 2002; Cho and Pucik 2005). The Resource-Based View 
(RBV) theory therefore serves as a potentially useful tool for ex-
plaining EO-IC in the EF in terms of intangible asset investment 
(R&D, human capital training, reputation). Various studies sup-
porting this idea, point towards a shift from the use of tangible 
to intangible resources as leverage for more efficient exploitation 
of assets and the achievement of competitive advantage over ri-
vals (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Rua 2018; Khan et al. 2019). Howev-
er, the process through which these resources drive competitive 
advantage is unclear, having even been dubbed by the strategic 
management literature as “the missing link” (Chatzoglou. et al. 
2018). Recent research suggests that firms use these resources to 
strengthen their dynamic skills and capabilities and thus gain an 
edge over their rivals (Teece 2007; Wu 2010). 
Some of the variables cited in the literature as innovation and 
entrepreneurship conditioners are country-level factors. Duran 
et al. (2016) mention minor shareholder protection or the skills 
level of the country’s labour force as paradigmatic examples of in-
stitutional drivers. Our study attempts to contribute to the search 
for the explanatory variables of EO-IC in the FE in two contrasting 
institutional environments (Latin America and Spain) where the 
internal and external barriers to entrepreneurship and innovation 
are potentially so diverse. Some issues worth highlighting relat-
ed to the labour market (skills development problems and labour 
contracts), internal organizational factors (lack of funds and read-
iness for change in management and the workforce), and the in-
stitutional environment (the fiscal treatment of R&D investment; 
minor shareholder protection; development of the financial sys-
tem; scientific and technical knowledge; governance regulations). 
This study calls for investigation into the main contributing fac-
tors and indicators of the capacity for sustainable competitive ad-
vantage driven by growth and profitability and based on EO-IC in 
FEs; that is, corporate governance, corporate strategy and perfor-
mance or value creation (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2014). 
The research on corporate governance and its relationship 
with EO-IC considers variables such as the family’s involvement 
in management (Arzubiaga et al. 2018; Calabrò et al. 2020); CEO 
generation (Durán et al. 2016); family ownership concentration 
(Gómez-Mejía et al. 2014; Decker and Günther 2017; Arzubiaga 
et al. 2018); or the volume of external resources (Nieto et al. 2015). 
With respect to corporate strategy variables, the research fo-
cuses on the relationship between EO-IC and the productivity 
of labour and capital, particularly in the FE. Thus, Block (2010) 
claims that sole ownership by the founder has a positive impact 
on EO-IC and also on intangible asset productivity. In a similar 
vein, Classen et al. (2014) in a comparative analysis of innova-
tion activity in FEs and non-FEs find higher levels of tangible 
asset productivity and lower innovation costs in FEs, albeit with 
a lower level of labour productivity relative to non-FEs. However, 
Morck and Yeung (2003) highlight that an aversion to invest-
ment in tangible assets hampers the productivity of innovation 
investment in FEs. Finally, Zellweger (2007) claims that, due to 
their focus on long-term objectives, FEs are more likely to rely 
on tangible investment to strengthen their EO-IC. 
Finally, in several studies value-added or resource-creation vari-
ables are found to explain innovation in the FE. Internal and family 
resources play an essential role; firstly, because access to external 
funding is limited by small firm size or guarantee shortage and, sec-
ondly, because conflict can arise between external investors focused 
on short-term profits and the family who have a long-term com-
mitment to socio-emotional wealth preservation (Cruz et al. 2012).
Our research objective, therefore, is to compare the behaviour 
of these variables in Latin American and Spanish FEs and check 
for variation attributable to differences in the legal-institutional 
framework, financial system or cultural environment. This study 
contributes to the literature on FEs and the tendency to innovate 
in several ways. One is to provide a fuller understanding of the 
process through which intangible assets can lead to a compet-
itive advantage for FEs, the distinctive characteristics of which 
provide a novel context for exploring the underlying factors of 
EO-IC or any of its dimensions (innovation, pro-activeness, and 
risk assumption). Another is to probe deeper into the impact of 
the new variables (relating to corporate governance, corporate 
strategy and performance) on EO-IC. In this way, we aim to val-
idate the reported effects of the paradigm shift on entrepreneur-
ship in general and the FE in particular. Finally, our study will 
analyse the gap in terms of family firm EO-IC between two in-
stitutional environments as diverse as Latin America and Spain, 
thereby admitting the possible influence of institutional factors 
which could help to explain the relationship that concerns us.
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Our study continues as follows. Section 2 comments on the 
main theories on EO-IC developed in the business management 
literature, taking into consideration the analysis of the compo-
nent dimensions of corporate governance, corporate strategy 
and value added. Section 3 describes the specification of the em-
pirical model for testing our hypotheses using data on 182 large 
family firms (1,820 observations for the period 2008-2018) dom-
iciled in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uru-
guay and Spain. Section 4 gives the interpretation of the results, 
and the paper concludes in Section 5 with a general discussion 
and summary of the findings.
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1.  Corporate governance mechanisms, business strategy, internal 
funding and EO-IC in the family enterprise 
As stated in the introduction, entrepreneurial activity pro-
motes creativity and innovation and is a transcendental means to 
long-term survival for FEs (Arzubiaga 2019). The characteristics 
of these firms in terms of ownership and governance structure, 
corporate strategy and emphasis on internal funding provide an 
ideal case study for the analysis of innovation and entrepreneur-
ship issues (Steier 2003; Lumpkin et al. 2005).
A joint socio-emotional wealth (SEW) and resource-based 
(RBV) approach is a useful choice for the study of non-com-
plex, intangible-intensive organizations, such as FEs (Habber-
shon and Williams 1999; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011). Our first 
area of analysis concerns the family ownership level and per-
centage of family board members and the implications of these 
for the FE corporate governance structure and its relationship 
with EO-IC.
In this respect, higher ownership concentration and a lower 
degree of board autonomy from family control lead to heavier 
investment in human and financial capital and higher profitabil-
ity gains (Andres 2008; Munari et al. 2010). This lack of autono-
my increases the emotional burden on family members and their 
commitment to the business. Thus, the greater the involvement 
of family owners in EO-IC decisions, the stronger their ten-
dency to prioritize family concerns over business interests (Le 
Breton-Miller et al. 2011). The current owners will want to do 
everything in their power to hand down the family business and 
wealth to future generations, and will therefore take a cautious 
and discouraging attitude with respect to EO-IC (Gómez-Mejía 
et al. 2010). Thus, a large family ownership could have a nega-
tive effect on its EO-IC performance (Chrisman and Patel 2012). 
This leads us to propose our first hypothesis: 
H1: High family ownership concentration or board dependence 
on the family will have a negative impact on EO-IC in the FE.
Borrowing is another FE corporate governance practice 
which is closely related to family control and managerial discre-
tion through two mechanisms: the use of free cash flow and the 
ambidextrous nature1 of innovation investment.
1 Ambidextrous in the sense of simultaneous innovation exploration and 
exploitation.
With respect to managerial discretion in free cash flow us-
age, it is worth noting that tight control by a majority of family 
ownership could dissuade non-family managers from the discre-
tionary use of free cash flow, especially in large firms. Howev-
er, the responsibility for strategic EO-IC decisions lies with top 
management team (TMT), in line, specifically, with long-term 
survival objectives, which could be hampered by excessive fami-
ly control over the use of free cash flow (Talke et al. 2010).
Meanwhile, a preference for autonomy and family control 
clearly impacts on owners’ financing decisions (Dreux 1990). 
Thus, some authors describe entrepreneurs prioritizing autono-
my and using their own resources or retained profits to finance 
innovation (Shrivastiva and Grant 1985; Hutchison 1995), while 
Stoney and Winstanley (2001) report that family firms’ aversion 
to shared ownership drives them to use credit for that purpose. 
Meanwhile, Van der Wijst (1989) claims that new generation 
CEOs show less resistance to borrowing and a greater willing-
ness to embrace non-family investment. Various studies find an 
association between a control-oriented family business plan and 
a higher propensity to borrow.
Furthermore, the low-risk investment decisions typical of 
FEs bring the interests of majority family shareholders closer 
into line with those of creditors than those of minority share-
holders, thereby easing access to credit from financial markets 
(Croci et al. 2011). 
The above reasoning motivates the following hypothesis:
H2: The use of debt financing in FEs, associated with family 
control and constraints on managerial discretion, will have a posi-
tive impact on the financing of EO-IC activities.
Another variable with potentially significant implications 
for EO-IC development is the proportion of family managers 
and degree of generational diversity on the board of directors 
(Murphy and Lambrechts 2015; Querbach et al. 2020). Family 
involvement in the management team fosters a propensity to-
wards EO-IC activities through family members’ strong com-
mitment to firm survival (Casillas et  al. 2011). Meanwhile, 
younger generations, being less risk averse, more highly trained, 
and more diverse than their predecessors, are able to contribute 
tacit knowledge of business processes and information passed 
down by previous generations (Kellermanns 2008). This leads us 
to formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: A higher proportion of family board members and greater 
generational board diversity have a positive impact on EO-IC in FEs.
The distinctive management and succession patterns of fam-
ily firms enable the identification of certain traits of corporate 
strategy (basically, the productivity of capital and labour) relat-
ing to their levels of innovation, risk taking and pro-activeness 
in EO-IC (Habbershon and Pistrui 2002; Lumpkin et  al. 2005). 
The resource-based theory claims that a company’s profits are 
due in large part to the stock of tangible and intangible resourc-
es (Barney 1991; Aiello et al. 2020) which it uses to build EO-IC 
capacity as a means to gain a competitive advantage and thereby 
promote long-term survival. Thus, a firm’s critical assets in terms 
of knowledge, entrepreneurial capacity and innovation ultimately 
reside in its human and tangible capital. Calabrò et al. (2020) show 
precisely how the presence of family board members contributes 
to the accumulation and efficient use of intangible assets (R&D, 
tacit knowledge) and thereby improves EO-IC in the family firm. 
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Based on these assumptions we posit the following hypothesis:
H4: Tangible/intangible and labour productivity are positively 
related to EO-IC in the EF.
One of the main potential obstacles to EO-IC is access to 
internal or external financial resources. According to the be-
havioural agency theory and the socio-emotional wealth per-
spective (Kotlar et  al. 2018), external funding through new 
equity issues can lead to conflict between the long term goals 
of the current generation of family owners and the short-term 
goals usually adopted by external investors. The EO-IC pro-
cess, therefore, works better if the external investors are spe-
cialized in some area and able to provide value-added services 
as well as financial resources (Cirillo et al. 2019). According to 
Benfratello et al. (2008), the main form of R&D investment in 
the private sector is through internal financing. Muñoz-Bullón 
and Sánchez-Bueno (2011) note that FEs have less opportuni-
ty for R&D investment because of an internal resource deficit, 
which in many cases forces them to seek credit or other forms 
of external funding. In short, the desire to perpetuate the fam-
ily dynasty and maintain control over assets makes the owners 
of family businesses more inclined to use internal than external 
funding to finance R&D investments (Bacci et al. 2018; Kupp 
et al. 2019). 
Therefore we propose the following hypothesis:
H5: There is a positive link between internal resource genera-
tion and EO-IC in the FE.
2.2.  Institutional environment and EO-IC in the FE: Latin America 
vs. Spain
A comparative analysis of entrepreneurial capacity and 
innovation in the FE in institutional contexts as disparate as 
those of Latin America and Spain will help us to determine 
whether the explanatory power for the process underlying EO-
CI resides in institutional or country-level factors. From pre-
cisely this institutional perspective, Duran et al. (2016) reach 
the conclusion that the impact of family-firm characteristics 
on innovation performance varies between environments with 
different levels of minority shareholder protection or work-
force education.
Family firms still make a decisive contribution to national 
economies in areas such as tangible and labour competitiveness, 
export volume or job creation. In developing countries, fami-
ly firms form the nucleus of new business creation and wealth 
transfer (Carney 2007). Similarly, the prevalence of FEs in a 
given geographical area stimulates cooperation and thereby the 
creation and ongoing development of innovations (Block and 
Spiegel 2013). As a consequence, Latin America is a geographical 
area of rapid growth and international influence. With a popula-
tion of around 600 million, it is a major supplier of raw materials 
for manufacturing markets where it has partnerships with lead-
ing companies worldwide (Nicholson 2011). Family firms form 
the majority in this area of the world (Pérez and Lluch 2016) and 
thus provide a context of unsurpassable research relevance. The 
contrasting cultural, legal and financial contexts of Spain and 
Latin America will determine the potential influence of corpo-
rate governance, corporate strategy and value creation variables 
on EO-IC in their respective FEs. 
Three institutional factors that could impact differently on 
Latin American and Spanish FEs are the economic and finan-
cial environment, the political and social context and the legal 
framework. Speaking from the financial and economic angle, 
we could say that Latin America has switched from a poli-
cy of regional protectionism in the 1960s (Lansberg and Per-
row 1991) to one of destabilizing and deeply challenging trade 
openness. This switch was instigated by the leading countries of 
Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, etc.) in a 
process beginning with state intervention and gradually evolv-
ing towards the privatization of businesses (Gras and Mendo-
za-Abarca 2014). 
Latin American countries are characterized by the shallow-
ness of their banking systems (credit/GDP ratio below 50%), 
which raises the cost of banking services. Another characteris-
tic feature is small bank size, which prevents economies of scale 
and the adoption of new technologies that would boost compet-
itiveness and enable a more fluid and efficient relationship with 
the business sector. Many Latin American economies are highly 
dollarized, a fact which leaves their financial systems more vul-
nerable to solvency and liquidity risks while conditioning their 
lending policy towards businesses. 
Spain’s geopolitical environment, on the other hand, which 
features a deregulated financial system with a low degree of 
government intervention, a high level of protection for mi-
nority investors and a recent history of multiple bank mergers, 
has acted as a lever for improving corporate productivity and 
efficiency. Another important factor which should not be over-
looked is that the European Union has a single currency and 
a market with 400 million potential consumers. Four decades 
of financial stability within the context of the European single 
market, therefore, have boosted the competitiveness, funding 
potential and growth capacity of Spain’s family businesses. At 
the political and social level, meanwhile, three key contrasting 
factors between Latin American and Spanish firms have their 
origin in the constant economic changes in Latin American 
economies which have created an environment of social con-
flict that has triggered a migratory flow to the cities, which ac-
commodate 80% of the population (UNEP 2010). The results 
of these population shifts are higher unemployment, structural 
deficits, and education systems with insufficient capacity to 
train a skilled workforce (Poza 1995; Nordqvist et  al. 2011). 
These social issues are also reflected in business organizations, 
which have been forced into a process of constant evolution 
and adaptation to government norms and policies (Lansberg 
and Perrow 1991).
The second notable factor is the strong political involvement 
of some family managers of FEs. In countries where political 
instability is the norm, dual commitment to family and busi-
ness interests on the one hand and government policies on the 
other can create potential conflicts of interest within the family 
and even among board members. A third and last peculiarity 
of the Latin American family enterprise is its youthfulness in 
comparison with those of Europe or North America. This, to-
gether with a high concentration of family ownership, forms a 
so-called group-structured business with a single and clear ob-
jective, which is none other than to pave the way for new family 
generations. This results in multigenerational involvement and 
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sufficient decision-making autonomy to enable the promotion of 
EO-IC within the firm. In Spain, on the other hand, only excep-
tionally does one find either politically involved board members 
or corporate diversification in family firms.
With respect to legal frameworks, Cabrera-Suárez and San-
tana-Martín (2004) note that FE corporate governance practices 
are inevitably affected by the legal framework within which they 
operate. Both Latin America and Spain have civil law systems, 
traditionally associated with low-level protection for minority 
shareholders and high corporate ownership concentration (La 
Porta et  al. 1999; Faccio and Lang 2002). In Spain, however, 
EU regulations (Directive 2017/828), developed by the Central 
European Bank and incorporated into Spanish stock market 
rules, promote market transparency and prevent the diversion 
of profits by large shareholders. This is far from the case in Latin 
America, where the weakness of the legal system can lead to the 
replacement of state functions by FEs. Thus, we can observe how 
micro-enterprises emerge in so-called subsistence entrepreneur-
ship (Beckert and Dewey 2017), small and medium-sized family 
businesses grabbing economic opportunities as they arise (Basco 
and Calabrò 2016), or large family conglomerates using a search 
strategy and exploiting any available profit-making opportunity 
(Morck and Yeung 2003; Robles et  al. 2016). In short, we can 
say that the EU geopolitical environment has enabled Spain to 
achieve generally higher business competitiveness levels in all 
firms, FEs included.
Given the above, the climate of greater uncertainty sur-
rounding Latin American FEs necessitates a high level of flex-
ibility and adaptability in their EO-IC management, a fact 
which differentiates them from their Spanish counterparts in 
terms of corporate governance structure (Monteferrante and 
Piñango 2011).
These characteristic differences between the Latin American 
and Spanish business contexts suggest the following hypotheses: 
H6: Corporate governance variables have more impact on EO-
IC in Latin American FEs than in Spanish ones.
H7: Labour and capital productivity variables have less impact 
on EO-IC in Latin American FEs than in Spanish ones.
H8: Firm size and hi tech sector affiliation have a stronger posi-
tive impact on EO-IC in Latin American FEs than in Spanish ones.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data
The sample for this study is formed from individualized fam-
ily-firm cross-industry data drawn from the Orbis (Bureau van 
Dyjk) database for Spain and Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru) and for a period 
running from 2008 to 2018. The corporate governance data were 
taken from a report on Europe, the USA and Latin America pub-
lished by Heidrick & Struggles Consultors for the same period 
of analysis. Executive compensation elasticities were calculated 
from Boardex and ExecuComp. Data firm distributions by coun-
try and sector affiliation are shown in Tables 1 and 2, where it 
can be seen that the initial sample comprised 180 firms (1,800 
observations) with full data-availability for each of the study pe-
riods, thus constituting a balanced panel. To achieve the research 
objective of comparing innovation policies in two distinct con-
texts, 44% of the sample refers to Spanish FEs (80 firms), and the 
remaining 56% to Latin American FEs (100 firms).
Table 1 
Sample distribution by countries (2008-2018)
Country N. firms % N. observations %
Argentina  17  9.44%  170  9.44%
Brazil  17  9.44%  170  9.44%
Chile  18 10,00%  180 10,00%
Colombia  18 10,00%  180 10,00%
Spain  80 44.44%  800 44.44%
Mexico  18 10,00%  180 10,00%
Perú  12  6.67%  120  6.67%
Total 180   100% 1800   100%
Source: Own elaboration 
Table 2 shows the distribution of firms and observations by 
industries, all of which are adequately represented, with Manu-
facturing (29%) and Trade (23%) forming the majority.
Table 2 
Number of firms per sector
SECTOR N. firms %
N. 
observ. %
1. Mining and Construction 20 11.11% 200 11.11%
2. Food. Beverages. Tobacco. 
Wood. Cork and Paper. 53 29.44% 530 29.44%
3. Metals and metal products. 
Machinery. Equipment. 
Furniture and Recycling
22 12.22% 220 12.22%
4. Transport and 
Communications. Gas. 
Electricity and Water
15 8.33% 150 8.33%
5. Wholesale and Retail 42 23.33% 420 23.33%
6. Banks and other Financial 
Services 11 6.11% 110 6.11%
7. Services: Hotels and 
Restaurants. Automobile 
Repairs
8 4.44% 80 4.44%
8. Other Services: Health. 
Education. Social. Museums 
and Consulting
9 4.94% 90 4.94%
Total 180 100.0% 1800 100.0%
Source: Own elaboration 
3.2. Variables
The empirical estimation uses the regression model de-
scribed more fully in the next section and the variables described 
below (further details in Table 3).
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sales variation from t to t-1
Miller et al. (2015)
Surroca et al. (2010)









Brunninge and Nordqvist (2004)
Leverage: Degree of family 





Total debt over total assets Stoney and Winstanley (2001)




Bureau van Dijk (Orbis) 
Ownership independence 
index which ranges from 1 to 4 
Aparicio et al. (2019)
Arzubiaga et al. (2018)
Presence of family 
members and generational 
diversity on the Board of 
Directors
FAMILY
Index constructed from Orbis 
ownership data and equal 
to the percentage of board 
members with ties to the 
controlling family
Lee and Chu (2017)
Casillas and Moreno (2010)
Casillas et al. (2011)
Arzubiaga et al. (2018)
Murphy and Lambrechts (2015)
B) Corporate strategy
Intangible Capital 
Productivity ICPi .t =
Intangiblesi ,t
Assetsi .t




Productivity TCPi .t =
Tangiblesi ,t
Assetsi .t







Operating revenue over 
number of employees
Habbershon and Pistrui (2002)
Lumpkin et al. (2005)
Calabrò et al. (2020)
C) Performance measured as effective and efficient utilization of resources to generate sales 
Added value
AVi .t =
Salesi .t −Sales costsi .t
N .Employeesi .t





D) Control Variables 
Free Cash
Flow FCF / Salesi .t =
FCFi .t
Salesi .t
Free Cash Flow over total sales Michiels and Molly (2017)
Pindado et al. (2011)
Firm age LnAge Natural log of years since firm foundation
Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004)
Bianchi et al. (2015)
Size LnAssets Natural log of total assets Chrisman et al. (2015)Duran et al. (2016)
Tech level TECHCODE Index based on sector and OECD data. Ranges from 1 to 3
Kammerlander and Ganter (2015)
Garcés-Galdeano et al. (2016)
Source: Own elaboration based on theoretical literature review
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The dependent variable to be estimated is firms’ entrepreneur-
ship orientation and innovation capacity (EO-IC), taking entrepre-
neurship and innovation as R&D and other intangible investment 
inputs (Anderson et al. 2012) proxied by the following variable:
EO− ICi .t =
IAi .t − IAi .t−1
Salesi .t −Salesi .t−1
where IAi.t is the stock of intangible assets for firm i for period 
t and Sales is its total turnover for the same period. The same 
notation applies for period t-1.
The explanatory or independent variables included in the 
equations to be estimated are as follows.
The first set relates to Corporate Governance factors: (1) 
the percentage of capital held by the five main shareholders; (2) 
corporate debt measured as total debt over total assets; (3) own-
ership status and (4) the ratio of family and non-family board 
members.
Second, a group of firm productivity performance indicators; 
namely, the productivity of intangible (tangible) assets measured 
as intangible (tangible) investments over total assets; labour pro-
ductivity, is calculated as operating revenue over the number of 
employees; and added value per employee measured as the sales/
cost ratio over the number of employees.2
A third set of variables captures other factors potentially con-
tributing to entrepreneurship orientation and innovation capacity. 
The first is free cash flow (FCF), which is designed to capture discre-
tionary use of financial slack and its potentially weakening impact 
on entrepreneurship and innovation capacity. Others are firm age, 
expressed as the natural log function of the number of years since 
inception; firm size, expressed as the natural log of total assets (a 
classic among the variables that might affect FE innovation capaci-
ty); and, finally, industry technological intensity, which is one of the 
potentially most transcendental variables for firm innovation ca-
pacity. For classification purposes, we use the sectoral classification 
guidelines of the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and In-
novation and Structural Analysis Statistics Division (OECD, 2011).
3.3. Methodology
Using the variables described in the previous section, we test 
the proposed hypotheses with two forms of data analysis. We be-
gin with a descriptive analysis of the dependent variable and the 
three sets of explanatory variables proposed earlier, and then pro-
ceed to the explanatory stage by estimating the model for each set 
of determining factors of intangible investment intensity.
Using the proxy for corporate innovation capacity and the 
proposed explanatory variables, the equation to be estimated 
takes the following form. 




∑ + γ kPVi .tk
k=1
4
∑ + δ lTVi .tl
l=1
4
∑ +ηi +εi .t
2 Data on numbers of employees were obtained from the ORBIS database, 
web pages or via e-mail in the case of some Latin American firms.
In equation (1) the subscripts i and t refer to firm and time, 
respectively. The term βj is subdivided into four coefficients; 
one for each of the four governance variables under considera-
tion: ownership concentration, debt, board autonomy and the 
percentage of family board members. The term γk represents 
the 4 coefficients of the productivity variables: intangible as-
sets, tangible assets, labour and value added. Finally, δl denotes 
the four traditional control variables included in the model: 
free cash flow, firm age, firm size, and industry technological 
intensity. Random noise is divided into two components: one 
denoted by εit, which captures all the factors with a degree of 
impact on firm’s innovation capacity and corresponds to the re-
sidual standard error. However, the so-called firm-fixed effects 
(ηi) are usually included in the aforementioned noise term, 
which is potentially correlated with the explanatory variables 
and may lead to serious biases in the estimation. This “constant 
unobservable heterogeneity”, which may go unnoticed, can be 
removed by means of first difference estimation. Moreover, the 
two-step estimator, which includes the first-stage residuals ma-
trix, yields estimates robust to autocorrelation and heterosce-
dasticity (White 1980).
Nevertheless, since the endogeneity of the independent 
variables may pose a significant model estimation problem, 
we first tested for endogeneity in our model using the version 
proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) for fixed effects 
estimation using panel data, the results of which enable us to 
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for tangible and intan-
gible productivity, labour productivity and debt. Ultimately, 
the most appropriate estimation technique is the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and widely used in the empirical literature, 
which not only adjusts for simultaneity bias, but also enables 
us to handle a residual pattern robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
The two-stage GMM estimator simultaneously estimates 
equations in first differences and in levels, thereby overcoming 
the weak instrument problem which is characteristic of GMM 
estimation. For the equations in differences, we use a single lag 
of the level variable, while for the equations in levels we use all 
the available lags of the first-differenced variables (Blundell and 
Bond 1998). The GMM system estimator controls for possi-
ble model misspecification and instrument validity is assessed 
by testing overidentifying restrictions, correlation between the 
instruments and random noise with Hansen’s J. Non-rejection 
of the null hypothesis validates the instruments by ruling out 
their correlation with the error term (Pindado and Requejo 
2014). Since we are using the first-difference GMM estimator, 
the transformed model should test for potential second-order 
correlation using the m2 statistic to avoid serial correlation prob-
lems. Finally, Wald’s test is used to test the joint significance of 
the model coefficients.
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
Stage one consisted of an initial descriptive analysis of 
the selected sample. Thus, Table 4 shows the means, standard 
deviations, and the minimum, maximum and median values 
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of the study variable (entrepreneurship orientation and inno-
vation capacity (EO-IC), and the main explanatory variables 
proposed in the theory and methodology section grouped 
into three sets: corporate governance variables (CG), pro-
ductivity variables (PV) and traditional or control variables 
(TV). 
Table 4 
Descriptives for total sample
Variables # Obs mean S.D. min max median
EO-IC 1,255    0.0800    0.3192 –0.5277 0.9987 0.0079
C5 1,820    0.6913    0.3768 0.00 100 0.89585
LEV 1,388    0.5865    0.2038 0.2273 0.9077 0.6033
IND 1,820    2.0247    1.0811 1 4 2
FAMILY 1,820    0.5237    0.3202 0.05 1 0.5
ICP 1,372    0.0576    0.0795 0 0.2822 0.0205
TCP 1,372    0.3072    0.1911 0.0152 0.6872 0.2810
LP 1,381    216.52    222.99 35.82 928.62 140.55
AV 1,369    0.2747    0.1584 0.0649 0.6741 0.2379
FCFSALES 1,099    0.0830    0.0732 –0.0106 0.2696 0.0604
AGE 1,820    52.850     36.17 6 110 41
ASSETS 1,388 3.498.728 5.644.363 15.684.14 1.94E+07 752.506
EMPLOYEES 1,388    29.824    62.220 2 516.421 3.537
TECHCODE 1,810    1.5690    0.5777 1 3 2
Source: Own elaboration.
Some values worth mentioning relate to the form of govern-
ance in the sample firms. The first notable feature is the high 
level of ownership concentration (69.13%), a general character-
istic of Spanish and Latin American firms alike and particular-
ly pronounced in FEs. Another is high dependency on external 
resources as reflected in a mean leverage value of 58.65% with 
a median of 60.33%. The ownership status indicators, taken di-
rectly from Bureau van Dijk’s database, where values range from 
1 (less autonomy) to 4 (more autonomy), show a mean value of 
2.02. Finally, the percentage of family board members, unsur-
prisingly, reaches 52.37% on average. 
The productivity values are hard to compare with no frame 
of reference, although they are considerably higher for tangible 
than for intangible assets. Table 4 also shows an average firm age 
of 52.85 years (with a median of 41), a high free cash flow margin 
ratio (8.30%) and some bias towards low-tech sectors, as reflect-
ed in the mean value of the Tech Level variable, 1.56, which has 
a possible range of 1 to 3.
The estimates of equation (1) for the total sample, shown 
in Table 5, reveal that the explanatory power for EO-IC in FEs 
lies in productivity factors, governance and the traditional con-
trol variables. Thus, tangible and intangible productivity and 
labour productivity (H4) and generated added value (H5) have 
a positive influence on innovation capacity, in complete con-
trast to that of tangible investment; and widely disparate results 
emerge for the corporate governance factors. Both financial 
leverage (H2) and the percentage of family members on the 
board (H3) have a positive impact on EO-IC, while the impact 
of family ownership percentage (H1) and ownership status is 
negative. Finally, the results for the traditional variables reveal 
a positive impact on innovation from firm size and hi-tech in-
dustry affiliation, in line with expectations. Free cash flow and 
firm age, on the other hand, have a braking effect on R&D in-
vestment. The AR2 statistic shows no second-order autocorre-
lation, while Hansen’s J (see Section 3.3.) prevents rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments 
and the residuals of the GMM estimation, thereby validating 
the choice of instruments.
The analysis of joint significance3 by groups of variables giv-
en at the foot of Table 5 shows how the variables for corporate 
governance (family-specific assets), corporate strategy (capital 
and labour productivity) and internal resource creation (level of 
financial autonomy) reveal themselves as drivers of EO-IC in the 
family firm.
3 The joint significance results presented are for the productivity and cor-
porate governance sets, given that value creation is composed of a single variable 
(VAP) and individual significance suffices.
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Table 5 
Equation 1: Firm innovation capacity.  
GMM estimation
Dependent variable 





































(TCP, ICP, LP) (0.000)
Corporate governance 18.49***
(C5, LEV, IND, FAMILY) (0.000)
Source:  Own elaboration. Coefficient estimates and P>|z| (in 
parentheses). Hansen test distributed as follows: ÷2 with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated 
coefficients. ***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.
Table 6 
Equation 1: Firm innovation capacity. GMM Estimation  
(Spain vs. Latin America)
Dependent variable 
(EO-IC): Firm entrepreneurship orientation and innovation capacity

































HANSEN TEST 59.60 23.21
0.871 0.152
Productivity 56.88*** –33.04***
(ICP, TCP, LP) (0.0000) (0.000)
Corporate governance 50.67*** 14.19***
(C5, LEV, IND, FAMILY) (0.000) (0.000)
Source:  Own elaboration. Coefficient estimates and P>|z| (in 
parentheses). Hansen test distributed as follows: ÷2 with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of estimated coefficients. 
***,**, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6 highlights the main differences in EO-IC explanatory 
factors found in the comparison of FEs based on geographical 
origin, with Spanish FE data reported in column 1 and Latin 
American FE data in column 2. The most striking difference 
lies with intangible productivity, which is positive in the case of 
Spanish FEs and negative in that of Latin American ones. Own-
ership structure, on the other hand, has a much greater influence 
in Latin American FEs, where high ownership concentration 
usually means a higher level of EO-IC; an effect that is not ob-
served in Spanish FEs. Finally, one of the traditional variables, 
firm age, strikes another discordant note, by emerging as a valu-
able asset in Spanish FEs, while appearing irrelevant in those of 
Latin America. In summary, the analysis of joint significance re-
ported in the bottom rows of Table 6, illustrates how the strong-
est EO-IC drivers for Spanish FEs (corporate strategy factors 
and internal resource creation) actually constitute barriers to the 
innovation process in Latin American FEs, where they have a 
strongly significant negative impact. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Globalization and technological change have disrupted 
many aspects of society, particularly the business environ-
ment. Changes in social dynamics, together with the loom-
ing threat of artificial intelligence, have led to a new para-
digm based on entrepreneurship orientation and innovation 
capacity (EO-IC). With respect to the business sector, this 
new paradigm plays a key role in market economies, where 
state-regulated free enterprise is the main driver of economic 
growth and development. Against this background, the fami-
ly enterprise offers an exceptional research context which has 
already attracted the attention of the innovation and entrepre-
neurship literature. Despite the undeniable benefits of innova-
tion, family firms have certain characteristics which prevent 
their wholehearted commitment towards it. Thus, the related 
literature echoes the point that FE traits such as family control, 
a simultaneous focus on financial and non-financial goals, or 
the need to conserve socio-emotional wealth make the FE a 
particularly worthwhile setting in which to explore the under-
lying factors of EO or any of its dimensions, including innova-
tion, pro-activeness or risk assumption (Hernández-Perlines 
and Ibarra 2017; Arzubiaga et  al. 2018; Hernández-Linares 
and López-Fernández 2018). 
In order to analyse the key moderating factors in FE entre-
preneurship behaviour, this study focuses on the three main 
sources of heterogeneity proposed by Gómez-Mejía et al. (2014): 
corporate governance, corporate strategy and performance, 
some of which have already been addressed individually by oth-
er authors (Arzubiaga et  al. 2018). The results obtained show 
how the traditional variables of firm size and age, liquidity and 
industry affiliation have lost some of their explanatory power for 
EO-IC design and structure dynamics.
Nevertheless, these traditional control variables continue 
to feature in studies such as Hernández-Perlines and Ibar-
ra (2017) and Arzubiaga et  al. (2018). Indeed, Gómez-Mejía 
et al. (2014) highlight the role of the hi-tech sector, which they 
claim can alter the mixed gamble or trade-off between finan-
cial and non-financial goals in the FE by incentivizing R&D 
investment; a claim which is corroborated by our own study. In 
the mean time, however, other weightier indicators of entrepre-
neurship capacity and business innovation have been emerg-
ing. Corporate strategy variables, for example, should show a 
positive impact on EO-IC, as suggested by Gómez-Mejía et al. 
(2014) and as upheld by the results reported in this study for all 
the proposed productivity measures (tangible and intangible 
assets, added value and labour) except capital investment. The 
set of corporate governance variables emerge among the most 
influential, and authors such as Duran et al. (2016) emphasize 
the role played by corporate governance in innovation, heavily 
underlining the influence of factors relating to family control 
and ownership concentration. Our results hint at a reduction in 
risk aversion to the use of debt to stimulate FE growth and de-
velopment. The presence of family board members, moreover, 
far from discouraging EO-IC, is seen as a driver, especially if 
the CEO belongs to a younger generation of the family dynasty. 
The concurrence of various generations on the board likewise 
has beneficial effects on EO-IC, by facilitating the discovery of 
new opportunities and novel entrepreneurial and innovation 
initiatives. In a study about board of directors in family firms, 
Arzubiaga et  al. (2018) observe its negative repercussions on 
the transformation of entrepreneurship into innovation. How-
ever, the same authors obtain evidence showing the benefits 
from the involvement of the FE board of directors in designing 
service and control tasks or providing specialised knowledge 
and skills. Meanwhile, Gómez-Mejía et  al. (2014) find that 
EO-IC in the FE improves with the participation of institu-
tional investors. An analysis of the effect of family ownership 
concentration by Arzubiaga et al. (2018) proves inconclusive. 
According to our results, however, EO-IC in FEs suffers both 
from excessive family ownership and from too much owner-
ship independence, which can lead to tensions between family 
and non-family board members.
Our proposal echoes the institutional theory, whereby in-
novation performance is largely determined by country-level 
factors (Duran et al. 2016). Thus, we analyse whether EO-IC in 
Latin American vs. Spanish FEs is influenced by the prevailing 
institutional (legal, economic and cultural) environment. Our 
results evidence the notable role of productivity variables in the 
EO-IC of Spanish FEs. The explanation for this could lie in the 
degree of autonomy in business decision making they are allowed 
by the Spanish legal and regulatory framework, as a consequence 
of which the Spanish FE tends to imitate the behaviour of private 
enterprise in general by exploiting the potential synergies to be 
gained from placing family members on the board of directors in 
order to control agency costs. 
The influence of the institutional framework in the Latin 
American FE is rather different, however. Interaction between 
a weak legal and regulatory environment, labour market ineffi-
ciencies and a less developed education system enables an oligar-
chy formed by a few clans to influence State initiatives through 
the EO-IC. Under these conditions, and in the presence of weak 
internal and external governance mechanisms, the results show 
that the dominant role among the basic EO-IC parameters in 
the Latin American FE is played by variables relating to family 
ownership concentration, the presence of family members on 
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the board of directors and a reliance on debt driven by an under-
developed financial system.
This study presents a series of implications for professionals. 
Given the role of family firms as a pillar of economic and social 
development in both Spain and Latin America, their directors 
need to understand the enabling power of innovation and en-
trepreneurship, which can propel them to achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage. This paper identifies business strategy 
and ownership and governance factors as the main drivers in this 
respect, although their role varies considerably with the prevail-
ing legal and institutional environment, such that the traditional 
variables and ownership factors play the leading role in the case 
of Latin America, while productivity and governance factors are 
the most influential in that of Spain.
Finally, while deepening understanding of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in the family enterprise, this study spotlights 
the need for further research. For instance, the reported findings 
are based on a set of eight Latin American countries grouped 
into a single sample, and could therefore lead to unjustified 
generalizations. The use of a sample of countries with a specif-
ic institutional profile or the inclusion of accurate indicators of 
institutional strength, minority shareholder protection, etc., will 
no doubt help to elucidate the influence of this key factor. Fur-
thermore, while this study uses intangible investment as a proxy 
for entrepreneurship and innovation, the incorporation of more 
selective variables, such as R&D expenditure, would no doubt 
help to corroborate or fine-tune the findings (Surroca et al. 2006; 
Gómez-Mejía et al. 2014; Duran et al. 2016). Finally, although 
our study considers some measurable features of the family busi-
ness profile, such as the family’s share of ownership and family 
involvement in the board of directors, the family business is a 
multidimensional concept and it would therefore be appropriate 
to analyse the influence of other dimensions, such as the genera-
tional stage of the business or the involvement of the family in its 
management (Casillas and Moreno 2011).
Summing up in relation to the issues raised in the introduc-
tion, the results obtained help to build understanding of the pro-
cess whereby intangible assets lead to a competitive advantage 
for the FE. They therefore justify the inclusion of new explana-
tory variables in FE EO-IC patterns, based on productivity and 
corporate governance (family ownership, family CEO, multi-
generational board composition and the presence of non-fam-
ily board members). Furthermore, Latin American institutional 
(legal, regulatory, employment and education) frameworks are 
identified as the explanation for the insignificance of efficiency 
and productivity variables as compared with more traditional 
ones such as firm size and ownership concentration with respect 
to the design and development of EO-IC in the FEs of that part 
of the world. 
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